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Abstract Academic economists today are caught in a ‘‘Publication Impossibility
Theorem System’’ or PITS. In order to further their careers, they are required to
publish in A-journals, but for the vast majority this is impossible because there are
few slots open for them in such journals. Such academic competition maybe useful
to generate hard work; however, there may be serious negative consequences: the
wrong output may be produced in an inefficient way, the wrong people may be
selected, and losers may react in a harmful way. This article suggests several ways
to remedy this situation.
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1 An impossibility
Many economists feel that they work in the PITS. They are subjected to a
publication system, which demands extremely hard work, but offers only a minute
chance of success. Today, this applies in particular to young scholars who, in many
countries, know that they can only obtain a permanent position at a good university
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if they publish in an ‘‘A-journal.’’1 A conventional list of A-journals2 includes The
American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, and The Review of Economic Studies. Only when a
young scholar has had at least one article, preferably two or three, published in these
journals, can he or she hope to procure tenure or promotion to a full professorship. A
full professor is expected to have articles accepted regularly in these A-journals;
otherwise, he or she is considered not up to the task. These ‘‘publish in A-journals or
perish’’ requirements are rarely explicit or written down.3 That they do, in fact, exist
is based on the author’s recent conversations with both junior and senior scholars in
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.4
This article argues that it is simply impossible to meet this requirement because
the number of scholars trying to achieve publication in A-journals is far larger than
the number of slots open for publication. In order to borrow from a famous theory,
one can loosely speak of an ‘‘Impossibility Theorem’’ with respect to publishing
requirements: For the population of aspiring academic economists, it is in general
impossible to meet publishing requirements. Scholars can thus be taken to work in
the PITS, i.e., in a ‘‘Publication Impossibility Theorem System’’.
Table 1 shows the number of slots, or the supply, available in A-journals per
year.
Table 1 shows that in 2007 altogether 275 articles were published in A-journals.
More than 40% of those contributions were provided by scholars from the top US
universities (Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Yale, Berkeley, and Stanford); more than
80% of all articles by scholars working in the United States. If this distribution holds
in the future (and there is little reason to expect any drastic changes), an academic
1 The same holds for business schools in the United States exhibiting an ‘‘extreme emphasis’’ on
publications in A-journals (Starbuck 2005). For further evidence, see Moizer (2009).
2 See, e.g., Lee (2006) for various definitions and the corresponding literature.
3 Faculties of economics at numerous universities (e.g., the University of Linz in Austria), as well as
economics associations (e.g., the Verein fuer Socialpolitik, the association of economists in Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland), have an official list in which they assign points for publishing in A-, B-, C- etc.
journals. Typically, a publication in one of the A-journals listed above gives three times as many points as
a B-journal publication. There are also universities that explicitly offer a monetary reward for publishing
in highly ranked journals. The University of Economics and Business Administration in Vienna, for
example, pays authors 3,000 Euros for publication in what they define as an A?-journal (which, in
economics, includes the five journals in the text above, as well as six more), and 1,000 Euros for
publication in an A-journal, i.e., a top publication is defined to be worth three times as much as a second-
rate one (http://wu-wien.ac.at/forschung.praemie). The Tinbergen Institute in the Netherlands distin-
guishes between journals ranked ‘‘AA’’, ‘‘A,’’ and ‘‘B’’. Among the latter, are (otherwise highly regarded)
the reviews such as Economica, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, or Economic Letters.
Other universities do not consider journal publications lower than A at all. It is sometimes rumored that to
publish in B, C, or other lower-ranked journals has even a negative effect on one’s career.
4 As always, it is difficult to state whether, and to what extent, this and the following arguments apply to
the United States academic system because it is characterized by such a wide variety: The top universities
are very different from minor institutions which also call themselves universities. Another question is to
what extent the observations and suggestions discussed here also apply to disciplines outside economics.
While they can certainly not be directly transferred, there are indications that many aspects are also
relevant elsewhere, see, e.g., the discussion by Hewstone and Stroebe (2008) on social psychology.
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from any other country (out of the more than 190) in the world can expect to be in
the competition for the roughly 50 remaining slots.
It is extremely difficult to estimate how large the demand to publish in top
economics journals is in any given year. A rough estimate is that there are around
10,000 academics actively aspiring to publish in A-journals. The true figure is
probably even larger, as one single outlet, RePec, lists no less than 20,000 scholars
presently creating academic writing. Even if two-thirds of them are from the United
States, there are around 7,000 scholars from all other countries. However, it may
safely be assumed that a considerable number are not listed in RePec, precisely
because they have not yet been successful in publishing in one of the journals or
other publication outlets included in RePec. What matters is that, by necessity, an
extremely low share of aspiring scholars will be able to get published in an
A-journal. Publication in these journals is characterized by extreme excess demand.
2 This is just a tournament
The requirement to publish in A-journals can be understood as a tournament in
which only one person or, in our case, a few people can rise to the top, while the
great majority of contenders fail to do so (Frank 2001, 2004). Such a tournament
(Lazear and Rosen 1981) is held to provide the incentives necessary to put in lots of
effort and do better than the other contenders. These are the beneficial effects of
‘‘publish or perish’’ which conventional economics has in mind.
3 But there may be problems…
The tournament system reflected in the PITS possibly does not produce the claimed
positive overall effects, if the following four problems arise:
1. If the selection of articles is random or distorted
The articles accepted in the A-journals must conform exactly to a clearly
specified criterion. This criterion is defined within academia, or by the ‘‘republic of
Table 1 Slots in A-journals, 2007
Journal Total number
of articles
Articles by scholars
in top US universities
Articles by economists
in the US
American Economic Reviewa 102 44 (43%) 84 (82%)
Econometrica 51 18 (35%) 38 (75%)
Journal of Political Economy 31 19 (61%) 25 (81%)
Quarterly Journal of Economics 44 25 (57%) 37 (84%)
Review of Economic Studies 47 13 (28%) 40 (85%)
275 119 (43%) 224 (81%)
a Papers and Proceedings are excluded
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science’’ (see Polanyi 1967; Merton 1973; Osterloh and Frey 2009a, b), in our case
by the peer group of academic economists. Sociologists refer to such a criterion as
‘‘self-referential,’’ as it is independent of any outside evaluation. A self-defined
criterion could easily be criticized by arguing that any discipline should consider the
interests of the wider public. This is particularly true of economics. Many people
take it for granted that academic economists should help other people in society, in
particular, political and administrative decision makers, to better understand how
the economy works and to improve its performance [see, e.g., Colander et al. (2009)
addressing the systematic failure of academic economists to adequately deal with
the current financial crisis]. While it is difficult to define exactly what this means, it
is clear that such an objective is determined from outside the discipline.
Even if the internal criterion by the academic economics profession were
consistent with the external criterion described above—which can well be
doubted5—it remains open to debate whether the members of the discipline are
able to select the respective articles. The selection of articles relies on an elaborate
system of peer reviews, which is considered the only reliable ex ante evaluation
method. However, there exists substantial empirical evidence that in general the
peer-review process does not perform very well, and in particular that the selection
of articles for A-journals resembles a random process (see, extensively, Daniel
1993; Frey 2003; Bedeian 2006; Weingart 2005; Tsang and Frey 2007; Osterloh and
Frey 2009b; Gillies 2008; Raelin 2008). The inter-rater reliability is deficient (see,
e.g., Starbuck 2006); the evaluation of an article by various referees, on average,
correlates only by 0.2–0.3, which is also rather low. Moreover, Oswald (2007)
recently demonstrated that many articles published in B-journals get far more
subsequent citations than many articles published in A-journals. As citations are
considered the ultimate ex post evaluation in the profession, this evidence suggests
that the present refereeing process is open to criticism.
2. If the publishing activity is wasteful
Even if the selection of articles for A-journals were perfect (which it never is nor
ever will be), there remains the question whether the social benefits produced by
such a publication is worth the input of labor required. This is not necessarily the
case, as the hours needed to write an article acceptable for an A-journal can be
immense; some scholars work for a year or more to try to get a single article into
one of these few journals. Scholars are well aware that a considerable part of this
huge effort is devoted to technique and presentation, rather than to content. A large
part of the effort is devoted to writing the article such that it will meet the actual or
imagined requirements of the referees and editors.6 Referring to the high rejection
rates, Moizer (2009, p. 1) states a widespread feeling: ‘‘Something cannot be right
with a system which creates so much apparent waste’’. A large share of the articles
written with huge effort and time input are totally disregarded. The median number
5 See the charges of ‘‘autism’’ made against standard economics from many quarters. The movement,
which started in the Grandes Ecoles in France and led to an online journal, Post-Autistic Economics
Review, is well known.
6 ‘‘… academics may spend as much time on the style of their writing and the orientation of their
arguments as on the raw content’’ (Raelin 2008, p. 125; see also Black et al. 1998; Frey 2003).
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of citations of economics articles is zero, or close to zero. According to Laband and
Tollison (2003), in a sample of 73 journals in 1974 and 91 journals in 1996, 26% of
articles were never cited. One has to go through 70% of the articles before the
average per article has been cited more than once. This can hardly be considered
highly productive, as the ‘‘dry holes’’ dominate by far.
It may nevertheless be claimed that even if a vast majority of articles does
not make it into an A-journal, and even if the vast majority of publications in
A-journals (and elsewhere) were indeed of little or no value (as they are never
cited by peers), this production is necessary in order for a few gems to be
produced. It is indeed impossible to predict which scientific contributions peers
will consider to be important in the future (see, extensively, Osterloh and Frey
2009b). The gems only reveal themselves after some time, often a lengthy
period. However, this does not mean that the existing publication process should
be taken to be sacrosanct. Different institutional arrangements rather than the
existing tournament may be better able to produce the gems, and create less
waste. The fact that (especially young) scholars are forced to pursue publishing
in A-journals should not be taken to mean that this rule is efficient. It is
certainly difficult to undertake even a basic comparison between the social
benefits produced by the existing publication activity in A-journals and the huge
costs in terms of energy used specifically in trying to get articles published in
these journals (see Gans and Shepard 1994). It may be argued that at least the
part of the rent-seeking activity devoted to pleasing the referees and the editors,
and to fulfill purely formal requirements (such as the ways the citations have to
be arranged and the article has to be submitted) is wasteful.
The crucial question is whether a more efficient system is attainable. One
should actively consider alternatives to the present arrangement. It should be
legitimate to at least ask whether the overall productivity of economists, from
the point of view of society, would not be higher if they could choose more
freely what and where they wanted to publish (e.g., in the form of books,
contributions to collected volumes, and even in the general media), and even
whether publishing is the main, or the only, activity in which they should be
obliged to engage. It cannot be dismissed readily that economists might perform
a more useful social service if a larger number of them were induced to solve
pressing and applied current problems rather than to be ‘‘wasted’’ in the useless
effort of publishing articles in A-journals.
A more efficient policy than ‘‘publish in A-journals or perish’’ could possibly be
to induce scholars to first establish their credentials in economics by writing a
number of articles devoted to the solution of concrete issues that, due to their lesser
formal elegance, are inappropriate for A-journals.
3. If the ‘‘wrong’’ people are selected
A tournament among articles submitted to A-journals only leads to a satisfactory
selection of people in academia if writing top articles is the only relevant criterion.
This is doubtful as academics have to fulfill various other important activities, i.e.,
they should be engaged in multiple other tasks. The most important among these
are:
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– teaching;
– supporting young scholars (PhDs and postdoctoral students);
– informing and advising the public;
– participating in university administration.
Excelling in these tasks can be, but not necessarily need be, positively correlated
with the ability to write A-journal articles. As only peers can evaluate the value of
research, there is a permanent danger of an increasing gap between research and
practice. Few scholars in economics seem to be ready to seriously consider this
dilemma. They prefer to take it for granted that the research published in A-journals
is always useful to practice even though there does not seem to be any empirical
evidence to support that view (but neither to the contrary, see Frey 20067).
As the pursuit to publish in top journals is extremely arduous and time-
consuming, it is likely that a negative correlation between publishing and the four
tasks just mentioned is generally produced. Because of the time-and-effort
constraints, few scholars are able to perform these tasks sufficiently well and also
fully engage in the publishing tournament. The publishing record being easy to
measure, while the performance with respect to the four other tasks is not, the
multiple-task effect (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991; Prendergast 1999) suggests
that academics mainly engage in publishing efforts and disregard the other tasks.
Imposing strict requirements for publishing in A-journals also tends to lead to
an undesirable selection effect among participants, as intrinsically motivated
scholars, especially those interested in teaching and informing the public, are
likely to be put off while extrinsically motivated scholars thrive (this is the
crowding-out effect, see Frey 1997; Be´nabou and Tirole 2003). The fact that
there are always some extremely gifted and extrinsically motivated scholars who
excel in several of these tasks simultaneously is not a sufficient argument to
force all of them to participate in the publication tournament. There are not only
above average but also below average scholars for whom the requirement to
publish in A-journals takes away a very large amount of time and effort from
other tasks. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a well-functioning department
composed of A-journal publishing scholars only. A balanced mixture of various
capabilities is more likely to work successfully; in particular, it allows the most
gifted scholars to have the room to flourish.
4. If the reaction of the losers is harmful
The cost of the PITS depends to a great extent on how scholars unable to publish
in A-journals react and what their options are. Some people who in the past lost in
the tournament keep trying to publish in A-journals but it is unrealistic to assume
that they will do so over an extended period. Most of them are realistic enough to
realize sooner or later that they will not be successful. They may resort to several
kinds of behavior:
7 In a related field, accounting, some authors are prepared to conclude that accounting research has little
or no effect on practice, see Bedford (1978, p. 2), Dyckman et al. (1978, p. 87), Kaplan (1978, p. 168),
Sullivan (1993), and Moizer (2009, p. 3).
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(a) They can try to publish in lower-ranked journals knowing that based on that,
they will not attain a satisfactory position at a good university. The question is
whether such lesser career positions exist in a particular university system. If the
strict ‘‘publish in A-journals or perish’’ requirement is in force, such lesser career
positions do not exist, and these people, therefore, will have to leave and work
outside academia.
(b) The ‘‘losers’’ can decide to give up their plan to stay in the university system
and exit the profession. This selection effect is socially beneficial if the publication
tournament is fully efficient. Otherwise, the strict requirement to publish in A-
journals leads to an unwanted adverse selection of scholars able to write the
necessary A-level articles, but who may turn out to be of little use or even outright
failures with respect to other university tasks. The distribution of talent between
scholars who are able to publish in A-journals and those who are not is likely to
overlap. It follows that the worst scholars with top publications are less able (they
are ‘‘lemons’’) than the best scholars without A-level publications. An exit to
activities outside the university may be socially beneficial if the effort to publish in
A-journals helps them to be better trained in other occupations. This may, but need
not, be the case8 because the writing of articles for A-journals is a quite specialized
activity: a necessary requirement is to follow the self-defined criteria that the
economics profession happens to have during a particular period, but which
outsiders might not necessarily find important. Today, this refers to the specific way
Americans write scientific works,9 to the language, and especially to the techniques
of analysis used. An example is the current extreme focus on the ‘‘identification’’
problem in econometric analysis, i.e., the need to clearly establish often opposing
causal relationships. In many cases, discussions in academic seminars and the
decision to reject an article in a journal, are reduced to this issue, essentially
neglecting all other, possibly important, aspects. It sometimes seems that the content
of a contribution has become more or less irrelevant, and the only thing that really
counts is technical dexterity (see Ellison 2002; Frey et al. 2009). An economist
sharing this view with the public and wanting to concentrate on issues of content
rather than on technique finds it nearly impossible to publish in an A-journal. He or
she will then be lost to the profession.
(c) The ‘‘losers’’ stay on as long as they can in their university job (which in some
European countries means for very many years, if not for life). They may well be
psychologically depressed, even show signs of mental disorder. Others may become
aggressive and obstruct the work of those scholars who hope to meet the publication
requirements (see Lazear 1995 on sabotage). A milder form of such behavior is
taking a long time, and disregarding the time limits set by the editors, when asked to
8 It can be argued that an economist who manages to publish one or two articles in an A-journal is often
worse than somebody who engages in broader academic activities, and has published articles in
respectable, but not top, journals. The former has devoted all effort to writing articles acceptable to the
referees of the top journals, but otherwise is not well trained for the other academic tasks (I owe this point
to Reiner Eichenberger).
9 French or German scholars traditionally developed their ideas in a way, which differs fundamentally
from the way Americans do today. However, it should not be forgotten that this kind of writing was used
by some of the most original and best scholars in the discipline.
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referee (thus extending the already long duration journals take for even a first
decision) writing dismissive, hostile, or even devastating referee reports for
professional journals (Miller 2006). Circumstantial evidence suggests that such
negative attitudes have become more common than they used to be in the past,
reflecting the increasingly strict publication pressure.
Depending on what type of reaction prevails, the A-journal publication
tournament may lead to positive or negative consequences overall. The existing
system of forcing scholars to try to publish in top journals only, and disqualifying all
other publication outlets, may have negative consequences in various respects.
4 An open issue
If the analysis above is correct, then it is debatable whether the PITS is socially
beneficial or not. At the least, it should not be taken for granted (as is generally done
today) that the PITS is a good, or even the best, way to organize academia. Before
such a conclusion is drawn, a serious discussion of the possible negative effects is in
order, and much more empirical evidence is needed. The evaluation should not be
confined to considering the effects on (internally defined) ‘‘scientific excellence,’’
but should also consider the possible negative aspects such as imperfect and biased
selection of articles and of scholars, effects on other economic activities and on
those scholars not successful in the tournament. Moreover, the present system of the
A-journal publication requirement should be compared to alternative ways of
organizing science:
(a) One possibility would be to solve the multiple-tasking problem by making an
effort to measure all the aspects important for an academic career: teaching,
supporting younger scholars, linking up to the public, and participating in academic
administration, and so on. While this first option seems straightforward, it is not to
be recommended. It would lead to an enormous amount of evaluation, and scholars
would invariably find ways to ‘‘beat the system’’.
(b) A quite different, and even contrary, option is to resort to an overall
evaluation of young scholars based on the intuitive knowledge of seasoned scholars.
There are various possibilities to select such persons. An attractive option would be
to elect them by a vote among the members of the respective professional
organization. This would ensure that the peers making up the ‘‘Republic of Science’’
are in control. The scholars elected by such a procedure would be under the scrutiny
of the profession as a whole and would lose their reputation among their peers if
they pushed unfounded personal interests. This gives them an incentive to decide as
objectively as possible while maintaining an overall perspective. This option gives
the members of professional organizations more power compared to the system
prevailing today and helps to fight the oligopolistic tendencies of the small number
of A-journals.
Nevertheless, such a procedure seems to be ‘‘unscientific’’ because it is not based
on the seemingly neutral measures of publications in A-journals. However, such a
view is too simple. According to recent psychological research, ‘‘gut feelings’’ are
often superior to in-depth analyses (Gigerenzer 2002, 2007; popularized by
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Gladwell 2005). Indeed, many established scholars proceed in this way when they
exchange their views about younger scholars. What matters to them is indeed
the gut feeling, and not whether someone has published an article in a particular
A-journal.
Using the intuitive knowledge of seasoned scholars has, of course, disadvan-
tages. There is certainly the danger of an ‘‘old boys’ network’’ giving young
scholars an incentive to attempt to personally please the seasoned scholars.
Personality and friendship may matter more than research excellence because gut
feelings are to some extent influenced by such perceptions. On the other hand,
these claimed disadvantages should not be overrated. It should not be forgotten
that the present system focusing on A-journal publications is also influenced by
personal relationships and preferences, as well as by selfish interests. It has, for
instance, become a common practice in economics to abundantly and positively
cite possible referees to raise the chance of acceptance. In contrast, aspiring
scholars refrain from criticizing other scholars fearing that they will be chosen as
referees and will react negatively.10 Even more importantly, scholars in dire need
of publication are induced to follow the referees’ ‘‘advice’’ even if they clash
with their own insights and views. This behavior has been called ‘‘academic
prostitution’’ (Frey 2003).
(c) A third possibility is to restrict the PITS to the early phase of a scientific
career. Scholars must learn the tools of the trade and must show that they are able to
use them with profit. Thereafter, one should let scholars proceed as they see fit for
themselves (see more fully Osterloh and Frey 2009b).11 This allows them to exhibit
their intrinsic motivation in scientific research at least for the remaining part of the
career. An obvious disadvantage is that scholars in later phases of their careers are
not subjected to any external monitoring and may no longer engage themselves in
research. This may well be so but an academic system should be designed to enable
the best rather than to prevent the worst.12
(d) Yet another possibility would be to more openly shape several levels of
scientific careers. In particular, there should be careers at universities and research
institutes for which it is sufficient to have published in one or several of the
hundreds of other general and specialized journals, but also in the form of books and
internet publications, as well as participation in current public debates (i.e., acting as
a ‘‘public intellectual,’’ see Posner 2002). Such a policy would serve to produce a
broader portfolio in the economics profession with respect to type of contribution,
10 Such behavior is, of course, inconsistent with the generally held view of referees solely acting
according to professional standards and ethics. It is, however, difficult to see why the economic model of
behavior essentially based on self-interest should not apply to scholars in their role as referees.
11 The academic system in some countries works in this way: full professors in particular are not required
to show that they continue to publish (or not). To the extent this is the case, the second suggestion has
already been realized.
12 It should be kept in mind that no system is able to exclude persons who do not perform well after
having entered it. The relevant question is how large their share is, and how badly they affect the system.
In the case of academia, the damage is not so large because such people normally decide to engage more
in teaching and in administrative tasks. This helps the more productive scholars to have time to do
research.
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content, techniques and universities.13 With the present focus on A-level
publications, diversity—a crucial requirement for originality—is indeed threatened
as has been empirically shown (see Osterloh and Frey 2009a, b). Requiring each and
every scholar to aspire to publish in A-journals is likely to be a flawed focus, and
strengthens the oligopolistic power of the five A-level journals whose number and
composition has remained constant over an extended period of time.14 As in other
such factually closed markets, the demanders (i.e., the scholars wanting to publish in
such a journal) may to some extent exploit this situation by forcing them to adjust to
their preferences and formal requirements. Empirical analysis15 suggests that
authors from prestigious universities have greater success with A-journals because
of their affiliation, but not because they do better research.
Unfortunately, in several European countries (notably in Germany and Switzer-
land) professors in applied universities (formerly called Fachhochschulen) are now
required to engage in advanced research and to publish at the same level and with
the same intensity as their colleagues at scientific universities. This expands the
prevailing emphasis on top-level publications even further.
Each of these (and possibly other) options has both its advantages and
disadvantages, which must be carefully considered in the context of the conditions
existing in a particular country at a particular moment in time. In countries where
established scholars can attain only limited international importance, the emphasis
on publishing in A-journals may turn out to be a preferable strategy. In contrast, in
countries where an academic career is more open, less emphasis on A-journal
publication records and a more general evaluation by elected seasoned scholars may
be more advisable. This article does not propagate any of the options discussed but
wants to call attention to the major shortcomings of the present system of ‘‘publish
in A-journals or perish’’ to the disregard of other scholarly contributions. We
certainly need more empirical evidence on many opinions raised in this article. The
major intention is to point out that there are viable alternatives that beg for an open
discussion.
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